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COMMENT

The Credit Industry and Identity Theft: How
to End an Enabling Relationship
ERIC T. GLYNN†

INTRODUCTION
“An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.” - Benjamin
Franklin

The popular Web comic xkcd recently ran a strip
featuring a man in a military-style cap, sitting at a
computer, using an—apparently Web-based—missile launch
program.1 The program first asks the man for the target’s
coordinates, and then for his e-mail address.2 In the final
frame, the program asks the man to retype his e-mail
address for verification.3 Playing on this theme in the
accompanying text, the author, Randall Munroe, muses: “I
hear in some places, you need one form of ID to buy a gun,

† J.D. Candidate, Class of 2013, SUNY Buffalo Law School. I would like to
thank Professors Patrick J. Long and S. Todd Brown for their helpful
suggestions, and everyone at the Buffalo Law Review for their hard work.
1. Randall Munroe, The Important Field, XKCD, http://xkcd.com/970/ (last
visited Oct. 9, 2012).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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but two to pay for it by check. It’s interesting who has what
incentives to care about what mistakes.”4
Although Munroe’s missile program is obviously a joke,
his gun remark could literally be true: federal law only
requires one form of identification for a firearm purchase,
but retailers may require more from a check-writer due to
the propensity for fraud or insufficient funds to render the
check worthless.5 Regardless, he invokes a well-established
precept of economics and tort: often, reasonable precautions
will not be taken unless the actor has an incentive to act, or
bears a cost for inaction.6 In the comic, the proprietor of the
fictional missile launch program has an economic incentive
in ensuring the e-mail address is correct, as the e-mail
address is a tradable commodity.7 The accuracy of the
location about to be destroyed by a missile, however, is
someone else’s problem. The failure to make even a modest
effort to ensure the correct target is acquired, in an
environment in which any such measures may be lifesaving, comes with no price tag attached. And so, without
an appropriate economic disincentive, the actor that is in

4. Id.
5. Federal law only requires one form of ID to purchase a gun. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(II) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (referring to “the” identification
document presented before a transfer of a firearm, implying only one is
required). Meanwhile, many businesses are very strict about who they accept
checks from, for the reasons mentioned, so it is conceivable that a business, such
as a gun shop, might require two forms of identification for its customers paying
by check, despite only requiring one to merely purchase the firearm.
6. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33
(1972) (“If . . . the benefits in accident avoidance exceed the costs of prevention,
society is better off if those costs are incurred and the accident averted, and so
in this case the enterprise is made liable, in the expectation that self-interest
will lead it to adopt the precautions in order to avoid a greater cost in tort
judgments.”).
7. A consumer’s e-mail address has become, in many ways, his online
identity. Cf. Lenny Zeltser, Why On-line Social Identity and Reputation is a Big
Deal,
LENNY
ZELTSER
ON
INFO.
SEC.
(Nov.
3,
2010),
http://blog.zeltser.com/post/1470112351/social-identity-reputation.
Online
entities value this information for a number of reasons, ranging from perfectly
reasonable (having a way to reset a password), to annoying (soliciting their
customers with information about their products or services), to troubling
(creating a personality profile with aggregate user data), to illegal (reselling the
addresses to unsolicited marketers or “spammers”).
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the best position to safeguard against disaster has very
little reason to.
Such is the present state of the consumer credit
industry. Despite being in existence for over 100 years,8 it is
fraught with fraud because those most integral to the
process often do very little to avert it.9 Indeed, identity theft
would often be preventable if creditors and consumer
reporting agencies (“CRAs”) adopted some what seem to be
common sense standards of verifying that credit applicants
are who they claim to be.10 Meanwhile, credit has become,
more and more, an individual’s economic lifeblood: good
credit is required for everything from renting a car to
getting a job.11 As it stands, however, the credit industry has
little incentive to adopt preventative measures, as it has
been difficult for consumers to hold creditors and credit
bureaus accountable for their lapses in care.12 This dearth of
recourse for identity theft victims is the result of a
frustrating combination of congressional clumsiness and
judicial indifference.13 While Congress has, over the past
four decades, enacted some important legislation in its
attempt to provide consumer credit protection, these
measures have ranged from incomplete to completely
toothless.14 Courts, in the wake of such disjointed guidance,
have been cool toward allowing claims against the credit
industry to proceed, regardless of whether those claims are
based in federal, state, or common law.15 Thus, despite an

8. Equifax was established in 1899 as “Retail Credit.” Simson Garfinkel,
Separating Equifax from Fiction, WIRED, Sept. 1995, at 96, 96.
9. See infra Part I.C.
10. See infra Part II.B.1.
11. See infra Part I.D.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part II.B.2.
14. See Krista A. Dotson, Note, Your Good Name: Identity Theft and the
Consumer—A Casenote of Andrews v. TRW, Inc., 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 611, 613
(2004) (“Although a myriad of legislative measures addressing identity theft and
privacy issues are available to the personal consumer, the legislation, in its
current form, can only be described as ‘piecemeal’ or ‘reactionary.’”); infra Part
II.B.2.
15. See infra Part II.B.
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increase in criminal convictions,16 identity theft victims
have found the legal system perplexingly hostile to their
claims, leaving them uncompensated and—worse—leaving
intact a credit system that facilitates fraud.17
That is why this Comment advocates a legislative and
judicial attitude adjustment in favor of better protecting
consumers and their increasingly important credit.
Legislatively, Congress need only make some minor
improvements to give teeth to existing consumer credit
rights. Judicially, courts need to recognize the legal bases
upon which a victim may sue creditors and CRAs: The Fair
Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and common-law negligence.
In either instance, relatively small common-sense changes
are all that’s required to finally force the credit industry to
stop playing fast and loose with consumers’ information and
to finally stop identity theft before it occurs.
Part I discusses what identity theft is, how the credit
industry operates, how that operation leads to identity
theft, and how this fraud harms victims. Part II outlines the
various culpable parties in a given identity theft case
(creditors, CRAs, and the identity thieves themselves), what
role they play in identity theft, and how they have been
largely exonerated from victims’ claims against them by an
unsympathetic legal system. Finally, Part III explains how
the law, particularly considering recent developments, could
allow for recovery against creditors and CRAs who
negligently compromise consumers’ identities, and how, at
long last, we might allow identity theft victims a real means
of recovery for the harm they suffer, and finally stem the
tide of identity theft.
I. BACKGROUND
A. What Is Identity Theft?
What this Comment refers to as identity theft is
actually a subset of the larger concept of misappropriating
16. See Javelin Study Finds Identity Fraud Reached New High in 2009, But
Consumers are Fighting Back, JAVELIN STRATEGY & RES. (Feb. 10, 2010),
https://www.javelinstrategy.com/news/831/92/Javelin-Study-Finds-IdentityFraud-Reached-New-High-in-2009-but-Consumers-are-FightingBack/d,pressRoomDetail.
17. See infra Part II.
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someone’s personal information for a dishonest purpose.
The identity theft at issue here is “true name fraud,” where
a thief uses a victim’s personal information to open a new
account.18 Other forms of identity theft include “account
takeovers,” where a thief uses an existing credit account
without the victim’s consent,19 and “criminal identity theft”
where a person accused of a crime gives a victim’s
information instead of their own to avoid repercussions of
conviction.20 These instances, while regrettable and
certainly damaging to victims, already to a large extent
have preventative measures in place,21 as well as
predictable remedies,22 and are thus beyond the scope of this
Comment.
In true name identity theft, a perpetrator acquires the
victim’s personal information through any variety of means:
dumpster diving, stealing mail, misappropriating employee
information, phishing scams, and countless others.23 And
while better protection of that personal information is
certainly one means to combat identity theft, in a world
where information is shared so easily and required for so
many transactions, the ability to effectively seal off one’s
personal information from any potential threat is nearly

18. Anthony E. White, Comment, The Recognition of a Negligence Cause of
Action for Victims of Identity Theft: Someone Stole My Identity, Now Who Is
Going to Pay for It?, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 847, 852 (2005).
19. Id. at 851.
20. Mignon M. Arrington, Establishing Appropriate Liability Under the Fair
and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 357, 358 n.7
(2011).
21. Law enforcement officials, unsurprisingly, take many measures to ensure
an individual’s identification, checking government identification, and later
fingerprinting and photographing a suspect. See JOHN N. FERDICO, HENRY F.
FRADELLA & CHRISTOPHER D. TOTTEN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE PROFESSIONAL 346 (10th ed. 2009).
22. For example, federal law prohibits credit card companies from holding a
consumer responsible for unauthorized charges if reported missing before
misuse, preventing any damage to his or her credit. See FED. TRADE COMM’N,
CREDIT, ATM, AND DEBIT CARDS: WHAT TO DO IF THEY’RE LOST OR STOLEN, FTC
FACTS
FOR
CONSUMERS
1
(June
2002),
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/credit/cre04.pdf.
23. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TAKING CHARGE: WHAT TO DO IF YOUR IDENTITY IS
STOLEN 2-3 (Feb. 2006) (on file with author).
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impossible.24 Our personal information is used in any
number of daily transactions and is actively collected and
stored in countless databases.25 This is done not only by
government entities and CRAs, but by commercial data
mining organizations who sell (portions of) the information
to other commercial interests hoping to learn more about
their target demographics.26 As Professors Robert Sprague
and Corey Ciocchetti warn:
The amount of personal identifying information collected in
modern life is vast: transactional data is tracked, cell phones are
monitored, Web surfing is recorded, and our moves in public are
recorded by surveillance cameras. “The small details that were
once captured in dim memories or fading scraps of paper are now
preserved forever in the digital minds of computers, vast
databases with fertile fields of personal data.” “Individually, each
of these pieces of personal information represents a mere pixel of
[someone’s] life, but when pieced together, they present a rather
27
detailed picture of [that person’s] identity.”

This ubiquity of personal information means there is an
abundance of opportunity for a consumer to have his
identifying information compromised. Whether by a thirdparty’s malicious infiltration or by an entity’s improper
handling, data breaches are exceedingly common:
“[B]usinesses, financial groups, educational institutions,
government entities, and medical healthcare groups have
all reported unauthorized access of personal data.”28 While
24. See Raymond G. Mullady, Jr. & Scott D. Hansen, Identity Theft
Litigation: A Roadmap for Defense and Protection, UTAH L. REV. 563, 564 (2008)
(“Technological innovation has facilitated the efficient creation, transmission,
and storage of substantial amounts of information, including consumers’ credit
histories, financial records, and other personal identifying information. . . .
Online shopping, online banking, and other transactions can be completed over
the Internet. In addition to the Internet, computerized databases and networks
allow companies to maintain computerized customer information and data that
further enhances the utility of commerce—both online and over-the-counter. But
the development of consumer credit in our nation’s economy has unfortunately
opened the door to identity theft.”).
25. See Robert Sprague & Corey Ciocchetti, Preserving Identities: Protecting
Personal Identifying Information Through Enhanced Privacy Policies and Laws,
19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 91, 93 (2009).
26. See id.
27. Id. at 95 (citations omitted).
28. Id. at 97.
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stronger standards protecting consumer data are clearly
needed,29 from a practical standpoint, misappropriation and
misuse of personal information is almost inevitable. As
such, we are all potential victims of identity theft.
On a much more trivial note, this Comment will use the
phrase “identity theft” instead of alternate terms like
“identity fraud” or “imposter fraud.” Despite not being
technically sound,30 this phrasing dominates the legal and
media landscape,31 and so I use it in an attempt to enhance
clarity. I defend my choice because the term “identity theft”
has caused some consternation among certain members of
the judiciary.32 This Comment will also sometimes refer to
perpetrators of identity theft as “identity thieves” for
reasons of linguistic simplicity.
B. What Is the Credit Industry?
The credit industry, or at least the credit industry to
which this Comment refers, is a vast informal association of
creditors—such as banks, financial institutions, credit card
companies, utilities, and service providers—and credit
bureaus, also known as consumer reporting agencies or
CRAs.33 In this industry, the creditors solicit consumers to
29. Id. at 94. For a good overview of the protection of consumer information
and the law, see Mullady & Hansen, supra note 24, at 570-84.
30. Conceptually, theft is the underlying crime and fraud or deception is the
means by which that theft is carried out; that is, identity describes the kind of
deception or fraud, not what is being stolen. Some state codes reflect this
concept, see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.180 (2010) (referring to the act as “Theft
by Deception”).
31. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5-902 (2011); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.78
(McKinney 2010) (referring to the acts as “Identity Theft”).
32. See infra Part II.A.
33. These definitions are consistent with those provided in Title 15, Chapter
41 on Consumer Credit Protection of the United States Code. See 15 U.S.C. §
1691a(e) (2006) (“The term “creditor” means any person who regularly extends,
renews, or continues credit; any person who regularly arranges for the
extension, renewal, or continuation of credit; or any assignee of an original
creditor who participates in the decision to extend, renew, or continue credit.”);
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (2012) (“The term “consumer reporting agency” means any
person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis,
regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating
consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose
of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any means or

222

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

open credit accounts with them, offering either cash or
services now in exchange for payments, usually subject to
interest, later.34 Consumers must apply for these credit
accounts, a process that almost invariably consists of the
creditor purchasing the consumer’s credit report from one of
the three major CRAs: Experian, Equifax, or TransUnion.35
A credit report is an agglomeration of a consumer’s
information, but is primarily concerned with previous credit
accounts and payment history.36 If that report is favorable,
and its corresponding “credit score” is high enough, the
creditor will grant credit to the consumer,37 and the
consumer may almost immediately begin obtaining cash,
goods, or services, and charging them to his or her account. 38
The appeal of this kind of arrangement to consumers is
immense: as of May 2011, United States consumers carried
a whopping $2.44 trillion in debt.39 Of that total, $795.9
billion is revolving debt, an open line of credit that is paid
off in installments, a category that refers almost exclusively
to credit cards.40
C. How Does the Credit Industry Facilitate Identity Theft?
Creditors feed off this consumer desire for instant
gratification and as a result have great incentive to make
access to credit as simple as possible.41 Thus, opening a
facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing
consumer reports.”).
34. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, GETTING CREDIT: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT
YOUR
CREDIT,
NAT’L
CREDIT
REPORTING
ADMIN.
3
(n.d.),
http://www.ncrainc.org/cmss_files/attachmentlibrary/Getting-Credit.pdf.
35. Id. at 3, 9.
36. Id. at 3.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 3.
39. FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE, CONSUMER CREDIT: SEPT. 2011,
FED.
RESERVE
1
(2011),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/20111107/g19.pdf.
40. Ben Woosley & Matt Schulz, Credit card statistics, industry facts, debt
statistics, CREDITCARDS.COM (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.creditcards.com/creditcard-news/credit-card-industry-facts-personal-debt-statistics-1276.php.
41. See Heather M. Howard, The Negligent Enablement of Imposter Fraud: A
Common-Sense Common Law Claim, 54 DUKE L.J. 1263, 1282 (2005) (“In a
competitive market, these institutions fear that a more rigorous screening
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credit account requires very little consumer information: a
full name, address, birthdate, social security number, and a
few questions about your income will satisfy an application
for most credit cards.42 Identification or other verification of
identity is seldom required;43 in fact, the entire process is
done with increasing frequency online.44 Often, creditors will
even send out attractive “pre-approved” credit applications
to consumers based on their credit metrics. 45 Unfortunately,
this environment of “easy credit” means easy identity theft
as well.46 As very little information is required to obtain
credit, an identity thief can open numerous fraudulent
accounts with information as basic as a social security
number matched with an approximate name and birth
date.47 Other information, such as employer, income, and
address, can often be fabricated completely.48
Long-postponed regulations requiring creditors to
establish procedures for verifying identity have hitherto
produced no noticeable effect. Federal law has also required
CRAs for years to make reasonably certain the applicant is
who he claims to be.49 Yet CRAs, which actually keep
records of this supplemental information, will still often
provide a credit report to a creditor even if the applicant’s
supplemental information is incongruous, as long as the
basic information is the same or largely similar to their

process might scare consumers away to competitors who do not take such
measures.”).
CREDIT
CARD
APPLICATION,
42. See,
e.g.,
CHASE
https://applynow.chase.com/FlexAppWeb/renderApp.do?CELL=6RRW&MSC=IQ
31197448&PROMO=DF01&SPID=DZVJ (last visited Nov. 8, 2012).
43. See id. (not requiring any further identification).
44. See Sprague & Ciocchetti, supra note 25, at 94-96.
45. See Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy Reform and Credit Cards 8 (NBER
Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 13265, 2007).
46. Although the financial downturn has reduced the number of credit offers,
this shift has not produced any noticeable difference in the level of scrutiny
given to the remaining accounts opened. See Barbara Kiviat, The Credit Crunch:
Where
Is
It
Happening?,
TIME
BUS.
(Sept.
30,
2008),
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1845818,00.html.
47. See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
48. Id.
49. Cf. infra Part II.B.2.
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file.50 This is because CRAs make money by selling these
consumer credit reports to potential creditors, and creditors
make money by maximizing the number of credit accounts
they open. Thus, their incentive to continue to operate in
this careless fashion outweighs any consideration of possible
liability, particularly when such liability has been seldom
enforced.
In the absence of any meaningful reason for the modern
credit industry to try to prevent it, identity theft is
rampant. In the year 2005, 8.9 million people were
victimized by identity theft.51 By 2009, that number had
increased to 11.1 million people, meaning that nearly 5% of
the United States population had been victimized by
identity theft over the course of a single year.52 Clearly, the
current methods of discouraging identity theft have fallen
short. And while there is certainly enough blame to go
around,53 the lack of accountability placed upon the credit
industry to take measures to prevent this phenomenon,
when it is well within their power to do so, cannot be
sustained.
D. Who Suffers the Consequences of Identity Theft?
Today, most Americans have either been affected by
identity theft themselves or know someone (and probably
several someones) who has.54 Once affected, a victim finds
himself or herself in a financial and legal mess that is, at
best, a major inconvenience to clean up, or at worst, a life50. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
51. Javelin Study, supra note 16.
52. Id.
53. For example, individuals and businesses can and should better safeguard
personal information. See Sprague & Ciocchetti, supra note 25, at 91; see also
FED. TRADE COMM’N, GETTING CREDIT, supra note 34, at 13. Also, the FBI and
other law enforcement agencies might make battling identity theft a higher
priority, as the DOJ and FBI have been notably sliding back combative efforts.
See Tony Romm, Report: Fast-growing crime of identity theft has ‘faded’ as DOJ,
FBI priority, THE HILL (Mar. 31 2010, 9:27 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hilliconvalley/technology/90007-report-identity-theft-has-faded-as-doj-fbi-priority.
54. I am making a reasonable inference based on studies that have shown
millions of Americans are affected each year, so that certainly cumulatively by
now the effects of identity theft are very familiar to the average American. See
Javelin Study, supra note 16.
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altering experience. This is due to incredible importance of
good credit in an increasingly credit-dependent economy:
today, it is required to do everything from renting a car to
getting a job.55 An individual can spend years trying to
reclaim his or her good name, meanwhile suffering from the
stigma of bad credit that may include denial of services,
loans, and employment, as well as humiliation and even
arrest.56 A recent FTC publication confirms that:
People whose identities have been stolen can spend months or
years—and thousands of dollars—cleaning up the mess the
thieves have made of a good name and credit record. . . . [V]ictims
of identity theft may lose job opportunities, be refused loans for
education, housing, or cars, and even get arrested for crimes they
didn’t commit. Humiliation, anger, and frustration are among the
feelings victims experience as they navigate the process of
57
rescuing their identity.

Individual victim’s stories range from regrettable to
horrifying. Many merely spend a substantial amount of
time and money clearing their good names,58 while others
miss out on significant but fleeting opportunities like
employment or home ownership.59 Victims could even face
criminal charges, as happened to the plaintiff in Patrick v.
Union State Bank60 who was arrested and processed in
55. See Fed. TRADE COMM’N, TAKE CHARGE: FIGHTING BACK AGAINST IDENTITY
THEFT 1 (Feb. 2006), http://www.wvago.gov/pdf/ftc_idt04.pdf.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Brendan Delany, Comment, Identity Theft: The Fair Credit Reporting
Act And Negligent Enablement Of Impostor Fraud, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 553, 553
(2005).
59. For a theoretical example of losing the opportunity to purchase a home,
see White, supra note 18, at 847. With regard to employment, many companies
now require credit checks prehire, as well as for advancement opportunities. See
Adam Cohen, Should Companies Use Credit Checks to Screen Job Applicants?,
TIME.COM
(Oct.
11,
2011),
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2096608,00.html ("The reliance
on credit reports in hiring is becoming widespread. A survey by the Society for
Human Resource Management found that 60% of employers do credit checks for
at least some positions."). Unlike being rejected for a credit account, where a
creditor is required to inform a consumer why he or she was denied credit, a jobseeking identity theft victim may never be made aware of the reason for his or
her rejection. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(h)(1) (2006).
60. 681 So. 2d 1364, 1366 (Ala. 1996).
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eleven jurisdictions after an identity thief opened a bank
account in her name and began passing bad checks. 61 Thus,
identity theft victims are subject not only to frustration,
stress, and embarrassment, but to real and quantifiable
losses. Yet these losses, as we shall see, have not been fully
appreciated in many courtrooms across the country.
II. COURTS ARE “UNFRIENDLY TERRITORY” FOR VICTIMS
As discussed, identity theft is an extremely widespread
phenomenon in the United States, leaving millions of
victims each year to deal with the potentially serious
fallout. So it may come as somewhat of a surprise to learn
that identity theft victims have been largely unable to
obtain redress in civil court, even when the defendant’s
culpability is clear and deliberate. In fact, in fourteen
states, identity theft victims are not even recognized as
victims in a legal sense, making their road to recovery that
much more difficult.62 This is because, historically, an
individual whose identity was fraudulently misappropriated
was not viewed as the crime’s actual victim.63 It was the
creditor who, at least theoretically, would have to absorb
the financial blow of nonpayment when the victim proved
the account was fraudulently opened.64 That antiquated
viewpoint misses two key considerations: the deleterious
effect of a negative credit account on a victim, discussed in
Part I.D above, and that creditors have the option to lend
credit more carefully if they so choose, but have not done so
believing more stringent measures would hurt business.65
Yet this theory still resonates in the judiciary, as many
victims have been denied recourse.66 This strange state of

61. See infra notes 105-14 and accompanying text.
62. See Bob Sullivan, Can ID Theft Victims Sue Imposters for Damages? Not
Yet, It Seems, THE RED TAPE (June 28, 2011, 2:26 PM),
http://redtape.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/06/28/6965859-can-id-theft-victimssue-imposters-for-damages-not-yet-it-seems.
63. See Howard, supra note 41, at 1266-67.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 1282.
66. See Arrington, supra note 20, at 373.
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affairs led one columnist to remark recently, “[c]ivil court,
for now, is unfriendly territory for identity theft victims.”67
A. Lack of Recourse Against the Identity Thief
Of all the parties that bear responsibility for an act of
identity theft, certainly the identity thief himself is the
most directly culpable. Yet, victims can rarely obtain any
civil redress from them.68 Often, this is due to enforcement
issues rather than legal ones: identity thieves are hard to
find, let alone prosecute, and overburdened law enforcement
agencies often lack the resources or the resolve to follow up
on the vast majority of identity theft cases.69 What’s more,
official figures do not include many incidents where the
victim’s own family misuses his or her identity, an often
unreported crime because those victims are either too loyal,
too afraid, or too young to prosecute family members just to
clear their credit.70 Lastly, even when identity thieves can
be identified and implicated, one can presume they will
often have little or no assets for a victim to recover from,
and are thus judgment proof.
In the rare event that a thief can be sued directly,
victims still face significant legal challenges in obtaining
relief from them. Consider, for example, the case of one
woman in Nebraska who recently discovered this the hard
way.71 In June 2011, Jaimee Napp sued her identity thief in
67. Sullivan, supra note 62.
68. See Arrington, supra note 20, at 373.
69. Arrests and convictions for identity theft have actually doubled from 2008
to 2009, and prosecutions tripled during the same timeframe. See Javelin Study,
supra note 16. However, these numbers are still a small minority of cases.
Martha Coakley, the Attorney General for the state of Massachusetts, was
herself the victim of identity theft, and she admitted the chances of her
“criminal ever being prosecuted are slim to none.” Robert McMillan, Identity
Theft Pays, Just Ask Martha Coakley, INFOWORLD (Jan. 22, 2007, 5:02 PM),
http://www.infoworld.com/d/security-central/identity-theft-pays-just-askmartha-coakley-032.
70. See Identity Theft: Is There Another You?: Joint Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade, and Consumer Prot. and the Subcomm. on Fin.
and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 24
(testimony of Charles A. Albright, Chief Credit Officer, Household International,
Inc.) (“In our experience at Household, we find that 50 percent of all incidences
of identity theft are committed by another family member.”).
71. See Sullivan, supra note 62.

228

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

her local state court.72 The defendant, Jackie Brown, was a
former coworker who admitted to the accompanying
criminal charges of “theft by deception” and served five
months in jail.73 Napp asked the court to award damages for
her resulting expenses, including lost time and wages spent
repairing her damaged credit, the cost of credit monitoring,
and the cost of therapy to treat what her therapist described
as post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) resulting from
the incident.74 According to Napp, she felt as though she was
unable to trust her other coworkers after the occurrence and
began experiencing paranoia.75 Judge John Hartigan was
perceivably unmoved by Napp’s plight, interrupting her
attorney’s closing argument to debate his use of the term
identity theft, ruminating that “[i]t’s not like someone took
her soul.”76 He did not similarly interrupt Brown’s attorney,
who said that Napp’s claim of PTSD was “a slap in the face
to every soldier returning from Iraq” and that she “should
‘move on’ from the incident.”77 While Nebraska is somewhat
unique in being so cold to identity theft victims suing their
perpetrators,78 Judge Hartigan’s insensitivity to fraud
victims is not. Indeed, as you will see, a legal indifference to
identity theft is a national affliction.
B. Lack of Recourse Against Creditors
With similarly less-than-encouraging results, some
identity theft victims have attempted to recover damages
against creditors who issue credit accounts to identity
thieves. These claims have been traditionally based in
common law negligence, sometimes specifically referred to

72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id. (“‘There is no law in Nebraska which makes this an easy
argument,’ Kuhn said.”). Other states though, such as Alabama, have
statutorily defined private rights of action against identity thieves. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 13A-8-199 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2007).
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as “negligent enablement of imposter fraud.”79 Other
plaintiffs have tried other common law claims such as
fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty,
defamation, and breach of contract. 80 The success of these
claims varies by state, but they have largely failed to take
root.81 This is despite the fact that creditors, as the final
gatekeepers of credit, are uniquely situated to prevent
identity theft.
1.Why Hold Creditors Accountable? It seems entirely
reasonable to assign the creditor itself a large portion of the
blame for an act of identity theft. Unlike CRAs, creditors
actually make the fateful decision to extend credit, based on
the information obtained from both the applicant and the
CRA.82 Often, as mentioned above, these creditors do not
require much consumer information: a name, address, birth
date, and social security number, as well as a few questions
about your income are all that comprises many credit
applications.83 Of those, only the social security number
need be precisely correct: the name and birth date often
only need be close to the ones listed on the consumer credit
report, while the address and financial information are
often wholly fabricated by the identity thief.84 With more
and more data being computerized, and consumer
information being required for a growing array of
transactions, this information is hardly difficult for an
identity thief to obtain.85 At the same time, the value of
credit continues to increase.86 Thus, it seems grossly
counterintuitive for entities as sophisticated as most
creditors are to grant access to one of consumer’s most

79. See, e.g., Polzer v TRW, Inc., 682 N.Y.S.2d 194, 195 (App. Div. 1998);
Huggins v. Citibank, N.A., 585 S.E.2d 275, 276 (S.C. 2003).
80. Arrington, supra note 20, at 372.
81. See id. at 373.
82. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
83. See supra Part I.C.
84. For example the plaintiff’s creditors in Andrews v. TRW, Inc. opened an
account for an imposter where only the plaintiff’s social security number and a
bastardized version of her name were based in fact. 225 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th
Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 534 U.S. 19 (2001).
85. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
86. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, GETTING CREDIT, supra note 34, at 2.
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valuable assets to someone who merely provides—easily
misappropriated—information.
And there is a litany of possible protocols that a creditor
might adopt that would significantly reduce the probability
of granting a credit account to an imposter applicant.
Creditors could more scrupulously compare an applicant’s
information with his consumer credit report to ensure he is
not employing simple identity theft tricks. Creditors could
look for the common signs of identity theft, comparing the
application to other fraudulent applications. Creditors could
call or mail the applicant at the telephone number or
address listed on the consumer’s credit report to verify that
the application was made by that person. Perhaps the
easiest and most effective preventative measure would be
for creditors to simply ask for photo identification from
applicants; as in my opening example, almost no business
nowadays would accept a personal check without proof of
identity, yet creditors will routinely give what is essentially
a blank check to applicants without such proof.87 Such
indifference is unsustainable, but continues in the absence
of any meaningful deterrent. Creditors are loath to make
consumers go through any more steps than necessary out of
a belief that consumer impulsivity benefits their bottom
line, and that any voluntary measures would mean
potential customers lost to competitors.88 But if an
enforceable standard existed requiring all creditors to take
certain measures to ensure an applicant’s identity prior to a
transaction, it would, at the very least, level the playing
field for responsible creditors.
2. Congress
(Nearly)
Addresses
the
Problem.
Frustratingly enough for victims, Congress actually enacted
such a standard called the “Red Flags” rules. In 1970,
Congress passed the FCRA, a landmark but ultimately
incomplete piece of legislation establishing a baseline of
consumer credit rights.89 Congress amended the FCRA via
87. Admittedly, personally checking ID would make the credit process more
cumbersome, but it would be up to a jury to decide if such a step would be
unduly burdensome. See Andrews, 225 F.3d at 1067. Short of this, technology
makes feasible a number of ways to send a copy of an ID, such as scanning and
faxing. That is less than ideal, but certainly better than nothing.
88. See Howard, supra note 41, at 1282.
89. FCRA, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1127 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (2006)).
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the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003
(“FACTA”),90 adding, among other things, what could have
been a powerful preventative measure called the “Red Flags
Guidelines and Regulations.”91 These rules, subsequently
enumerated by regulations that became effective in 2008,
require creditors to adopt “reasonable policies and
procedures” to identify the warning signs of identity theft
and react to those indicators.92 However, FACTA excluded
private enforcement of that standard through the FCRA’s
two enumerated causes of action.93 In effect, Congress
created a statutory standard of care, but rendered it
toothless by denying a private right of action.
It is plausible, however, that Congress never intended
to so limit the Red Flags rules, but simply drafted the
amendment poorly. At the time, the FCRA, which FACTA
was designed to strengthen, already contained provisions
specially authorizing private rights of action for both willful
and negligent violations of the Act.94 FACTA even included a
“Rule of Construction” clause articulating Congress’s desire
that no provision of the new act would abrogate preexisting
liability established by those sections.95 Nonetheless,
Congress obfuscated its meaning by tacking on a
subparagraph to the end of an unrelated subsection,96
exempting the entire section from liability for willful and
negligent violations.97 Due to its placement within a distinct
subparagraph, interpreting it as written gives rise to some
contradictions and redundancies.98 Thus, it has been the
90. Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159,
117 Stat. 1952, 1952 (2003) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x
(2006)) [hereinafter FACTA].
91. Id. at 1960-61.
92. Identity Theft Red Flags, 12 C.F.R. § 41.90(d)(2) (2012).
93. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(h)(8)(A) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
94. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n-1681o (2003).
95. See FACTA, § 1681n, 117 Stat. at 1993.
96. This subsection requires users of consumer credit reports to provide
notice to a consumer to whom they are offering less favorable terms due to an
unfavorable consumer credit report. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(h)(1).
97. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(h)(8)(A).
98. The limitation on civil actions, if construed literally as pertaining to the
entire section, would disallow a private cause of action for violations of the other
subsections that conceivably would have been susceptible to private liability
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subject of much debate whether Congress intended to deny
a private right of action for the entire section of creditor
requirements or merely for that particular subsection.99
Unfortunately for victims, the consensus has been decidedly
against a private cause of action.100 Thus, as it stands, the
creditor requirements under the FCRA rely solely on
administrative enforcement.101
3. Negligent Enablement of Identity Theft and Commonlaw Negligence. Left without a clear legislative mandate,
victims have sought relief via common law. Basing claims
primarily on negligence, plaintiffs have argued that
creditors failed to take reasonable measures to protect
potential victims from identity thieves, thus enabling
identity theft to occur.102 With some notable exceptions,103
however, these claims have not survived.104
The most notable exception was a 1996 Alabama
Supreme Court case, Patrick v. Union State Bank,105 and
perhaps only because of a particularly sympathetic set of
circumstances. Plaintiff Bridgette Patrick had her sixmonth old baby with her when she was arrested after a
pre-FACTA. This would render FACTA’s “Rule of Construction” meaningless.
See infra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Perry v. First Nat’l Bank, 459 F.3d 816, 819-20 (7th Cir. 2006);
Barnette v. Brook Rd., Inc., 429 F. Supp. 2d 741, 745 (E.D. Va. 2006).
100. See Perry, 459 F.3d at 822 (listing a number of cases finding §
1681m(h)(8) to bar private enforcement). But see Barnette, 429 F. Supp. 2d at
749.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(h)(8)(B) (“This section shall be enforced exclusively
under section 1681s of this title by the Federal agencies and officials identified
in that section.”).
102. See, e.g., Patrick v. Union State Bank, 681 So. 2d 1364, 1365 (Ala. 1996);
Polzer v. TRW, Inc., 682 N.Y.S.2d 194, 195 (App. Div. 1998); Huggins v.
Citibank, N.A., 585 S.E.2d 275, 276 (S.C. 2003).
103. See Wolfe v. MBNA Am. Bank, 485 F. Supp. 2d 874, 882 (W.D. Tenn.
2007) (“Because the injury resulting from the negligent issuance of a credit card
is foreseeable and preventable, the Court finds that under Tennessee negligence
law, Defendant has a duty to verify the authenticity and accuracy of a credit
account application before issuing a credit card.”); Patrick, 681 So. 2d at 1371
(“[T]he evidence could support a conclusion that [identity theft] was foreseeable
and that the bank was in the best position to prevent the fraud, and therefore
that the imposition of tort liability could be appropriate.”).
104. See, e.g., Polzer, 682 N.Y.S.2d at 195; Huggins, 585 S.E.2d at 278.
105. Patrick, 681 So. 2d at 1364.
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routine traffic stop.106 The officer had run her license and
discovered several warrants for her arrest on the charge of
writing “worthless checks.”107 Despite being able to show her
handwriting did not match that on the checks, she was held
and delivered to police in a nearby county to answer to
similar outstanding charges.108 She spent seventy-two hours
there, was exonerated, and was again transferred to
another nearby municipality.109 This grueling process
continued in this fashion as she eventually cleared her
name in all eleven jurisdictions in which she was wanted;110
in all, she spent ten days in jail, and several more appearing
in court.111
The reason for her ordeal was identity theft. An
imposter acquired possession of a temporary license issued
to Ms. Patrick, used it to open a bank account with the
defendant, Union State Bank, and proceeded to make
purchases with worthless checks.112 The bank teller later
testified that the imposter supplied no address, the
temporary license she presented contained no photo, and
that the signature she provided did not even match the one
on the license.113 Nonetheless, the bank allowed the
imposter to open the account and issued checks in Ms.
Patrick’s name.114
Patrick sued Union State Bank for negligence, lost on
summary judgment, but convinced the Alabama Supreme
Court to reverse.115 A successful negligence claim generally
requires the plaintiff to prove four elements: (1) the
defendant owed a duty to exercise a minimum standard of
care to the plaintiff, (2) the defendant did not conform to
that standard, (3) that failure to conform was the legal
cause of harm suffered by plaintiff, and (4) that harm was of
106. Id. at 1366.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. See id. at n.1.
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 1365.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 1372.
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the kind that is legally compensable.116 Here, the bank
argued that Patrick established neither duty nor cause: that
“absent a special relationship or special circumstances, a
person has no duty to protect another from criminal acts of
a third person,”117 and that the particular type of harm
suffered was not foreseeable.118 The court rejected both
arguments and reasoned that the bank was not like some
innocent bystander but rather a professional entity that in a
real way contributed, through its substandard business
practices, to the commission of the crime.119 The court held
that the risk that someone might falsely open an account in
another’s name was sufficiently foreseeable for the purposes
of establishing both duty and proximate cause, even going
so far as to say that incarceration of the innocent party was
a probable consequence of such an event.120 In any event, the
court continued, “[t]he bank undeniably thought that it had
a relationship with Ms. Patrick when it opened the
account,” thereby assuming a duty.121 In so deciding, the
court seemingly opened the door for identity theft victims to
hold banks accountable when sloppy business practices give
imposters access to their credit.
Alas, as quickly as the door was opened, New York’s
First Department slammed it shut: only two years after
Patrick, it rejected a similar claim for lack of duty. In Polzer
v. TRW, Inc.,122 a number of identity theft victims sued the
Bank of New York and Mobil Oil Credit Corporation for
issuing cards in their names to identity thieves.123 The
plaintiffs invoked a number of theories, including negligent
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A (1965) (“In an action for
negligence the plaintiff has the burden of proving (a) facts which give rise to a
legal duty on the part of the defendant to conform to the standard of conduct
established by law for the protection of the plaintiff, (b) failure of the defendant
to conform to the standard of conduct, (c) that such failure is a legal cause of the
harm suffered by the plaintiff, and (d) that the plaintiff has in fact suffered
harm of a kind legally compensable by damages.”).
117. Patrick, 681 So. 2d at 1367.
118. See id. at 1371.
119. See id. at 1368.
120. See id. at 1369.
121. See id.
122. 682 N.Y.S.2d 194 (App. Div. 1998).
123. Id. at 195.
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enablement of imposter fraud, simple negligence, negligent
infliction of emotional distress, prima facie tort, and
violations of the Deceptive Acts and Practices Act. 124 In a
cursory opinion, the Appellate Division for the First
Department rebuffed them all,125 and with regard to
negligence said:
New York does not recognize a cause of action for “negligent
enablement of impostor fraud”, and that plaintiffs otherwise failed
to state a cause of action in negligence, because BNY and Mobil
had no special relationship either with the impostor who stole the
plaintiffs’ credit information and fraudulently obtained credit
cards, or with plaintiffs, with whom they stood simply in a
126
creditor/debtor relationship.

The opinion did not elaborate much as to specific facts
of the case, nor upon what legal theory it rested its finding,
but cited to cases standing for the general common-law
precept that there is no “duty to control the conduct of third
persons to prevent them from causing injury to others.”127
The Polzer court made no mention of the Patrick holding.
Despite its brevity, however, Polzer was influential. In
2003, the Supreme Court of South Carolina cited it in its
certified answer to the South Carolina District Court’s blunt
inquiry: “Does South Carolina recognize the tort of
negligent enablement of imposter fraud[?]”128 In that case,
Huggins v. Citibank, N.A., despite finding that “it is
foreseeable that injury may arise by the negligent issuance
of a credit card,” and that such injury “could be prevented if
credit card issuers carefully scrutinized credit card
applications,”129 the court held that “[t]he relationship, if
any, between credit card issuers and potential victims of
identity theft is far too attenuated to rise to the level of a
duty between them.”130 The court made half-hearted
124. Id.
125. Id. at 196.
126. Id. at 195.
127. Purdy v. Pub. Adm’r of Westchester Cnty., 526 N.E.2d 4, 7 (N.Y. 1988).
Polzer simply cites Purdy and a handful of other cases in summarily finding a
lack of a “special relationship” giving rise to a duty. Polzer, 682 N.Y.S.2d at 195.
128. Huggins v. Citibank, N.A., 585 S.E.2d 275, 276 (S.C. 2003).
129. Id. at 277.
130. Id.
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reference to other potential remedies provided by federal
and state statutory regimes, before admitting that “these
regulations may not fully compensate victims of identity
theft for all of their injury.”131 As most courts have fallen in
line with Polzer, Huggins, and Perry, identity theft victims’
claims against creditors, with rare exception,132 have not
lasted long.
C. Lack of Recourse Against Consumer Reporting Agencies
Nor have claims against CRAs met with any great
success. Victims have attempted to hold CRAs accountable
for misconduct in both their roles as record keepers and as
furnishers of credit reports. As record keepers, CRAs
maintain the consumer’s payment history, as reported by
creditors.133 Consumers may challenge erroneous and
fraudulent entries in this credit history, though the process
is seldom straightforward.134 But before then, and of much
greater concern to our discussion, they furnish consumer
credit reports to creditors screening new applicants.135 To
obtain this report, the creditor must provide, along with his
or her permission to access the report, some of the
applicant’s basic personal information.136 It is during this
phase that the potential for prevention exists.
1. Why Hold CRAs Accountable? Any discussion of
identity theft necessitates a discussion of CRAs, or, as they
are more commonly known, credit bureaus. This is because
identity theft would not be nearly as dire for victims (or
perhaps even worthwhile for identity thieves) without the
existence of the CRA-issued consumer credit report. Indeed,
many of the ill-effects of identity theft discussed in Part
I.D—such as denial of credit, disruption of existing credit,
131. See id.
132. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
134. See Anne Kadet, Why the Credit Bureaus Can’t Get It Right, SMARTMONEY
MAG. (Feb. 2, 2009), http://www.smartmoney.com/spend/rip-offs/why-the-creditbureaus-cannot-get-it-right/ (“[A]ccording to a 2007 survey by pollster Zogby, 37
percent of consumers who obtain their credit reports find errors, and half of
those said they could not easily correct the mistakes.”).
135. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, GETTING CREDIT, supra note 34, at 2.
136. See supra Part I.C.
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and loss of employment opportunities—occur as a direct
result of CRAs issuing a consumer credit report tainted by
identity theft. To victims, CRAs become the face of their
struggle with identity theft as they work to remove the
resulting fraudulent entries from their records. That
process is fraught with its own pitfalls for consumers, 137 and
consumers must frequently resort to legal actions based in
FCRA violations or common law defamation to challenge
their reports, with mixed results.138 Even then, the court has
no real power to compel CRAs to remove the bogus
entries.139
Far from apologetic for these perils, CRAs have even
found a way to profit from their specter by selling “credit
monitoring services.”140 For a fee, the CRA will allow a
consumer to monitor his or her credit report and receive
notices when new activity is logged, with the goal of heading
off identity theft.141 Experian’s version of the service, the
misleadingly-named freecreditreport.com,142 runs television
commercials featuring a young bandleader and his
misadventures with compromised-credit, suggesting an
acute awareness by Experian of the pervasiveness of the
problem.143 Better means for identity theft victims to fix or
137. See Kadet, supra note 134.
138. See Arrington, supra note 20, at 372; White, supra note 18, at 857.
139. See id. (explaining that courts can issue fines, but cannot order the
mistake to be corrected).
TRADE
COMM’N,
140. See
Detect
Identity
Theft,
FED.
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/consumers/detect.html (last visited
Jan. 26, 2012).
141. Id.
142. It is misleading because it is not free (only your first seven days of the
service is), and its name/URL is suspiciously similar to annualcreditreport.com,
the official site established by the FCRA to allow consumers access to their
credit reports once per year. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC CONSUMER ALERT:
WANT A FREE ANNUAL CREDIT REPORT? THE ONLY OFFICIAL WEBSITE IS
(2006),
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/
ANNUALCREDITREPORT.COM
consumer/alerts/alt156.pdf.
143. In one such commercial, the young man is forced to work at a piratethemed restaurant because his credit was compromised by “some hacker [who]
stole my identity,” thus preventing him from obtaining better employment. See
Weezaloo, Funny Commercial from freecreditreport.com, YOUTUBE (Oct. 8, 2007),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YWnUmpQhiOw (using freecreditreport.com’s
commercial).
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remove erroneous credit report entries after the fact are
clearly needed, although that worthwhile discussion is
somewhat beyond the scope of this Comment. However,
these problems suggest that if CRAs are to play any role in
identity theft prevention, consumers will need some
powerful weapons to compel them to do so.
CRAs
are
primarily
databases
of
consumer
information.144 Pulling a consumer credit report reveals a
long forgotten personal history: old addresses, paid-off car
loans, and previous employers, all with various levels of
accuracy.145 As keepers of such a database, they are
uniquely situated to do some preliminary fact-checking
when a creditor makes a hard inquiry. As noted in Part
II.B.1, many fraudulent credit applications contain gross
factual errors—errors that a CRA with its vast database
should easily detect. Often, however, the CRA will furnish
the report as long as the social security number matches its
records.146 The absurdity of such practice was not lost on the
Ninth Circuit, which noted that while “people do use
nicknames and change addresses . . . how many people
misspell their first name? How many people mistake their
date of birth?”147 Stranger still, CRAs actually demand much
more validation for a consumer to request his own credit
report, requiring him correctly provide his name, address,
social security number, date of birth, as well as up to four
validation questions about his consumer history. 148 Some
similar common sense procedures at the point of transaction
would certainly go far in preventing disastrous results later.
2. Liability Under the FCRA. As it turns out, federal
law does place some responsibility on CRAs to verify an
applicant’s identity. In Andrews v. TRW Inc., the abovereferenced Ninth Circuit case, the court honed in on § 1681b
144. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
145. See
generally
ANNUALCREDITREPORT.COM,
http://www.annualcreditreport.com (last visited Jan. 26, 2012) (offering options
to request a credit report online, by phone, or through the mail).
146. Andrews v. TRW, Inc., 225 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2000), rev’d on other
grounds, 534 U.S. 19 (2001) (“[The credit bureau] let a social security number
trump all evidence of dissimilarity between the Plaintiff and the Imposter.”).
147. See id.
148. ANNUALCREDITREPORT.COM,
https://www.annualcreditreport.com/cra/
index.jsp (select state, then follow “Request Report” hyperlink).
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of the FCRA, which restricts the circumstances under which
a CRA may furnish a consumer credit report.149 According to
that section, a CRA:
may furnish a consumer report under the following circumstances
and no other: . . . (3) To a person which it has reason to believe-(A) intends to use the information in connection with a credit
transaction involving the consumer on whom the information is to
be furnished and involving the extension of credit to, or review or
150
collection of an account of, the consumer.

The Andrews court focused on the phrase “involving the
consumer,” and found that the requirement of reasonable
belief applies to this condition, i.e. that the CRA must have
“reason to believe” that the credit transaction actually
involves the consumer in question.151 The court rejected the
CRA’s argument that lawmakers merely used the term
“involv[ing]” in a casual sense, that a transaction merely
invokes the consumer’s identity, because “[w]e are reluctant
to conclude that Congress meant to harness any consumer
to any transaction where any crook chose to use his or her
number.”152
In that case, a woman’s identity was fraudulently used
by a former receptionist at her doctor’s office.153 Applying for
various credit accounts, the imposter combined her own
information with Andrews’s last name, birth date, and
social security number.154 She alternatingly used her first
name Andrea and a “clumsy misspelling” of victim
Andrews’s first name, Adelaide.155 Andrews sued TRW for
furnishing the report to creditors in violation of the FCRA.
Her claim was dismissed by the district court, but
reinstated by the Ninth Circuit, who held “[i]t is
quintessentially a job for a jury to decide whether identity
theft has been common enough for it to be reasonable for a
credit reporting agency to disclose credit information merely
149. Andrews, 225 F.3d at 1067 (citing to 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (2006 & Supp. V
2011)).
150. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A).
151. See Andrews, 225 F.3d at 1067.
152. See id.
153. Id. at 1064-65.
154. Id. at 1065.
155. Id.
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because a last name matches a social security number on
file.”156 In the end, however, Andrews’s claim was quashed
by the Supreme Court, who found that the FCRA’s statute
of limitations limited claims to within two years of the
incident, and thus had expired, in spite of the Ninth
Circuit’s insistence that the clock did not start until
discovery of the violation.157
Although the statute of limitations has since been
amended to five years after the incident or two years after
discovery,158 the reversal of Andrews has seemed to hinder
its influence. That may be set to change, however, now that
the Ninth Circuit has since taken up the issue in Pintos v.
Pacific Creditors Association.159 There, the court held
Experian to have violated the FCRA by issuing a credit
report on behalf of a consumer, Ms. Pintos, who was not
“involved” in the request.160 Pintos owned a vehicle that was
towed for an expired registration, and the towing company
“obtained a lien on the vehicle for towing and impound
costs.”161 Pintos did not claim the vehicle or pay the
outstanding charges, so the towing company sold it.162 The
sale price did not cover the amount owed, so it asserted a
deficiency claim against Pintos and later transferred that
claim to PCA, a collection agency.163 As part of its effort to
collect the debt, PCA “sought and obtained” Pintos’s credit
report from Experian.164 Pintos sued PCA and Experian for
violating the FCRA by obtaining her credit report without
her involvement.165 Despite the Andrews precedent, the
district court granted summary judgment for Experian.166
Reversing and remanding, the Ninth Circuit revived its
holding in Andrews, that to be “involved” in a credit
156. Id. at 1067.
157. TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 23, 25 (2001).
158. 15 U.S.C. § 1681p (2006).
159. Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 674-75 (9th Cir. 2010).
160. Id. at 675.
161. Id. at 673.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 672.
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transaction a consumer must be “a participant.”167 Without
this participation, Experian violated the FCRA by
furnishing the report.168 Adding some fuel to fire, the court
further held that § 1681e of the FCRA also requires a CRA
to make “a reasonable effort” to verify that a requesting
party intends to use the report for a permissible purpose,
and if it does not, it may be liable for that requesting party’s
FCRA violations.169 The Supreme Court declined to review
the holding,170 leaving § 1681b a potential tool to attack
CRAs who are careless in furnishing consumer credit
reports.
3. Negligent Enablement of Identity Theft and CRAs. To
the extent that other circuits are not convinced of the Pintos
interpretation of §1681b(a), there exist grounds for using
common-law negligence against CRAs that furnish credit
reports for fraudulent credit applications. Negligence claims
have been seldom used in the credit context generally,171 and
have not yet been invoked specifically against CRAs. This is
possibly the result of concern over to what extent FCRA
preempts related state claims,172 an area where there has
been a good deal of disharmony in judicial interpretation.173
It is true that § 1681h(e) and § 1681t(b) do set
preemptions on state authority with respect to certain
FCRA-related subject matter. Section 1681h(e) grants
immunity to CRAs and reporting creditors with respect to
the information included in a consumer’s credit report from
common-law “defamation, invasion of privacy, or
negligence” claims, absent a showing of “malice or willful
intent.”174 Section 1681t(b) enumerates a laundry list of
FCRA subject matter upon which states are preempted from

167. Id. at 675-76.
168. Id. at 675.
169. Id. at 677 (citing to 15 U.S.C. § 1681e (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)).
170. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Pintos, 131 S. Ct. 899-900 (2011).
171. Cf. supra Part II.B.3.
172. See Howard, supra note 41, at 1278-81.
173. See Wolfe v. MBNA Am. Bank, 485 F. Supp. 2d 874, 882-86 (W.D. Tenn.
2007) (discussing the four schools of thought regarding the dual state-claim
immunity provisions in the FCRA).
174. 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (2006).
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enacting further requirements.175 Some courts have
interpreted these two provisions to be complementary, with
§ 1681h(e) affecting common-law claims and § 1681t(b)
referring only to statutory enactments.176 In any case, these
provisions only apply to certain enumerated subareas, and
negligently furnishing a credit report is not among them.
The negligence at issue in that instance does not concern
the substance of the credit report, as § 1681h(e) relates to.
Nor does § 1681t(b) make mention of § 1681b(a), the
provision, implicated in Andrews and Pintos, restricting the
issuance of a credit report.177 In fact, so long as state law
claims are consistent with the requirements of the FCRA, §
1681t(a) specifically preserves their viability.178 Thus, the
subject of a negligent enablement claim cannot be said to be
preempted by the FCRA.
Causation in a CRA negligence claim also becomes a
slightly more complicated discussion, as there are two
potentially intervening third parties—the identity thief and
the creditor.179 However, as discussed in Part II.B.3 above, a
third party’s negligence or even criminal behavior will not
defeat a negligent defendant’s liability if the harm suffered
is of the type that made the behavior negligent in the first
place.180 In the case of CRAs, the possibility of identity theft
175. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b) (2006).
176. See Sites v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 646 F. Supp. 2d 699, 706-09 (M.D.
Pa. 2009).
177. See Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 672-76 (9th Cir. 2010);
Andrews v. TRW Inc., 225 F.3d 1063, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2000), rev’d on other
grounds, 534 U.S. 19 (2001).
178. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(a) (2006) (“Except as provided . . . this subchapter does
not annul, alter, affect, or exempt any person subject to the provisions of this
subchapter from complying with the laws of any State with respect to the
collection, distribution, or use of any information on consumers, or for the
prevention or mitigation of identity theft, except to the extent that those laws
are inconsistent with any provision of this subchapter, and then only to the
extent of the inconsistency.”).
179. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 441 (1965) (“An intervening force
is one which actively operates in producing harm to another after the actor’s
negligent act or omission has been committed.”).
180. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 (1965) (“If the likelihood that
a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the
hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent,
negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from
being liable for harm caused thereby.”).

2013]THE CREDIT INDUSTRY & IDENTITY THEFT 243
is exactly the reason that furnishing credit reports without
adequate verification is dangerous. Likewise then, the
subsequent culpable actions of creditors and identity thieves
should not serve to supersede a CRA’s liability.
Moreover, duty, the stumbling block in many negligent
enablement cases, should be even easier to establish for
CRA defendants than their creditor counterparts. Aside
from the preponderance of general duty considerations of
foreseeability and other policy considerations, which will be
discussed more in-depth in Part III.B.2 below, the common
objection that there exists no “special relationship” between
the plaintiff and defendant so as to give rise to a duty to
protect is less persuasive in this instance.181 It is certainly
arguable that a “special relationship” could exist between a
consumer and a CRA, as there is an existing association
between the two, prior to the negligent act, with the former
being the subject of the latter’s recordkeeping and the latter
being responsible for disclosing the former’s information.
That relationship could conceivably give rise to a duty to
protect from third-party harm.
III. WHAT CAN BE DONE?
Administrative enforcement and ex post facto remedial
actions only go so far in combating identity theft. As the
Court held in Marbury v Madison: “The very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an
injury.”182 But, as we have seen, individuals who become
victims of identity theft have largely been unsuccessful in
enforcing those protections. Without the threat of private
enforcement, the credit industry at-large has not been
forthcoming in adopting preventative measures. Congress
and the courts must remedy this dynamic; fortunately, this
does not require any grand sweeping changes to existing
law. In fact, some minor alterations to the FCRA and a
fresh look at existing tort concepts would go far in providing
redress for victims, and forcing the credit industry to adapt.

181. See Polzer v TRW, Inc., 682 N.Y.S.2d 194, 195 (App. Div. 1998); Huggins
v. Citibank, N.A., 585 S.E.2d 275, 277 (S.C. 2003).
182. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
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A. Legislative Solutions
Congress has taken some important steps in providing
consumers baseline credit protection, but is still pulling the
punches that could win the fight. Perhaps the simplest and
most preferable solution to this situation would be for
Congress to amend the FCRA.
First, Congress needs to remove its—perhaps
inadvertently placed—limitation on civil liability for
violations of the Red Flags rules.183 The standards, as they
are now, are painfully vague, requiring creditors to do
things like “develop . . . [an] Identity Theft Prevention
Program,” and take “reasonable policies and procedures,” to
“[i]dentify . . . Red Flags” and “[r]espond appropriately.”184 It
does finally put the onus on creditors to be proactive, but
allowing victims to use the rules to obtain redress would,
over time, help define these standards. Once a national
standard of reasonable creditor procedures is developed,
outlining what procedures are considered reasonable and
what responses appropriate, creditors will have no excuse
not to adapt, and to adopt preventative measures that may
finally turn the tide of identity theft.
Second, although some inroads have been made
judicially with regard to CRAs’ liability for furnishing credit
reports,185 a stronger and more specific standard is needed.
The statutory phrase “involving the consumer”186 gives too
much possible leeway. The FCRA should specify what basic
information the requestor must correctly provide and
require some certification that the creditor has made an
effort to verify the applicant’s identity.
Third, despite some extension by FACTA, the statute of
limitations for an FCRA claim is still insufficient. The
FCRA allows, at a maximum, five years from the date of
underlying incident to challenge a CRA.187 Meanwhile, a
CRA may lawfully list a delinquent account on a consumer’s

183. See supra Part II.B.2.
184. 12 C.F.R. § 41.90(d) (2012).
185. See supra Part II.C.2.
186. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a).
187. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681p(2) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
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credit report for up to seven years.188 Thus, the current
statute of limitations allows, at a minimum, a two-year gap
in which a consumer may have to suffer an erroneous entry
with no right to challenge it in court. A modification
synchronizing the two timeframes would rescue consumers
from being stranded in a procedural no man’s land.
B. Judicial Solutions
Despite Congress’s shortcomings in comprehensively
addressing identity theft, and until the courts get on board
with holding creditors and CRAs responsible for their
careless facilitation of identity theft, preventative measures
will be slow to emerge and identity theft will continue to
prosper. To that end, the judiciary has many legitimate
avenues open to it to expand the credit industry’s liability.
1. Overturn Perry and Allow Private Enforcement of the
Red Flags Rules. As discussed briefly in Part II.B.2 above,
there is a legitimate question as to whether Congress
actually intended to foreclose a private right of action for
creditor violations of the Red Flags rules. The provision in
question appears as a subparagraph to an amended
subsection requiring creditors to provide notice to
consumers who are offered less favorable rates due to their
credit report.189 This subparagraph, § 1681m(h)(8)(A),
states: “Sections 1681n and 1681o of this title [establishing
private rights of action] shall not apply to any failure by any
person to comply with this section.”190 Nonetheless, its
placement as a subordinate provision, along with other
inconsistencies, begs the question of whether it was meant
to apply to the entire section.
The leading case on the subject, Perry v. First National
Bank, found the language of the provision unambiguous
despite its dubious placement.191 The Seventh Circuit there
admitted that interpreting the tacked-on provisions to apply
188. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(4) (2006) (noting that “no consumer reporting
agency may make any consumer report containing any of the following items of
information: . . . (4) Accounts placed for collection or charged to profit and loss
which antedate the report by more than seven years”).
189. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(h)(1) (2006).
190. Id.; see FACTA, § 1681m, 117 Stat. at 1989.
191. Perry v. First Nat’l Bank, 459 F.3d 816, 821, 823 (7th Cir. 2006).
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to the entire section would result in some redundancy,192 but
that “redundancy ‘does not always produce ambiguity.’”193 It
based its determination largely on the absence of contrary
legislative intent, noting “that the legislative history of
FACTA is silent on the question of whether Congress
intended to preclude private rights of action to enforce the
entirety of § 1681m.”194
The court is correct to give important consideration to
legislative intent, as it is the primary factor in statutory
construction.195 But the court seems to completely miss the
express legislative intent conveyed in the Act’s “Rule of
Construction” provision, which states:
Nothing in this section, the amendments made by this section, or
any other provision of this Act shall be construed to affect any
liability under section 616 or 617 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(15 U.S.C. 1681n, 1681o) that existed on the day before the date of
196
enactment of this Act.

Granted, the Red Flags rules were contained in the
same Act,197 and would not have given rise to an existing
liability. However, other subsections that were in existence
could potentially be robbed of civil enforceability by
interpreting § 1681m(h)(8)(A) to apply to the entire section.
For example, § 1681m(a)(3)(A), which requires creditors to
notify consumers rejected for credit accounts of their right
to obtain a free credit report,198 existed pre-FACTA and
could have given rise to private civil liability if the creditor
192. See id. at 821 (“‘Section 1681s-2(c),’ which was also amended by FACTA,
‘expressly provides that the private remedies sections, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n and
1681o, do not apply to one portion of § 1681, namely 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(e), the
provision dealing with ‘red flagging’ of reports affected by identity theft.’
According to Perry, ‘Congress would not amend 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(c) to exempt
§ 1681m(e) from private remedies if all of § 1681m were already exempt from
private remedies by virtue of § 1681m(h)(8).’”).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 823.
195. See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 207 (1978) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (“The Court recognizes that the first purpose of statutory
construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature.”).
196. FACTA, § 1681n, 117 Stat. at 1993.
197. Id. at 1960-61.
198. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681m(a)(3)(A) (2006).
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did not maintain “reasonable procedures to assure
compliance” with the section. 199 Thus, to give §
1681m(h)(8)(A) the effect of applying to the entire section
would directly conflict with the express intent of Congress
not to affect existing liability. This violates the primary
canon
of
statutory
construction;
therefore,
that
interpretation should be rejected, leaving the Red Flags
rules enforceable through private causes of action.
2. Recognize Negligent Enablement of Identity Theft.
Finally, courts should begin to recognize and develop a
negligence standard of care for the credit industry. For
claims against creditors, this embattled approach is perhaps
the only attemptable means of redress currently available.
Against CRAs, the approach is untested but sound. By
allowing these claims to proceed beyond a finding of duty,
judges and juries will begin to carve out a standard of care
that defines what “reasonable” procedures a purveyor of
credit should be expected to take. Only when that standard
is identified and enforced will companies start to abide by it,
and finally begin preventing identity theft before its
destructive effects occur.
a. Establish Duty: Overturning Polzer and Huggins.
Courts must recognize the existence of a duty of care
between creditors and potential victims. The imposition of a
duty is strictly a question of law, and judges frequently
struggle with balancing competing policy considerations
with existing legal standards. In that regard, it is eminently
reasonable for courts to want to limit liability to instances
where there is some logical relationship between the
tortfeasor and the victim; in fact, it would be terribly unjust
to hold otherwise. But the majority view that there is no
relationship between an identity theft victim and the
creditor who opened the account in question is untenable. A
relationship such that would give rise to a duty of care can
be reached through a variety of means; to imply that some
sort of preexisting, on-going relationship is necessary for an
actor to be compelled to take reasonable care not to harm a
readily identifiable party is an unwarranted hurdle to
justice. Privity as a precursor to duty has, post–MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Company, long been discredited.200
199. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(c) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
200. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) (“We
have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the
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Yet these cases rely heavily on the antiquated precept
that a negligent party may not be held liable for the
criminal acts of another absent some “special relationship”
to the plaintiff.201
significantly over the years, as negligent defendants have
long been held liable for third-party acts so long as the
harm was of the type that made the misfeasance negligent
in the first place.202 To the extent that it remains a viable
defense, it is usually reserved for intentional physical harm
caused by third parties.203 At any rate, as the Patrick court
pointed out, the creditor in an identity theft case
“undeniably thought that it had a relationship with [the
victim] when it opened the account.”204 Thus, by the bare act
of opening an account in someone’s name, the creditor
arguably undertakes a relationship with that person. At the
very least, it should be aware that it will be affecting that
person in a profound way. Similar to claims for defamation
or invasion of privacy, there is no tangible interaction
between the defendant and the victim, but there is an
affirmative act that invokes a specific innocent party.
Therefore it is reasonable to necessitate that some care be
taken to prevent that party from being harmed.
Hence, duty here should be determined by more general
duty principles; adjudged by which, a strong case for the
imposition of duty can be made. In fact, the sheer
foreseeability of probable harm and the knowledge of the
specific party who stands to be affected provides a clear
basis for establishing a duty. Foreseeability, in most
jurisdictions, is the most important factor in determining
the existence of a duty.205 Foreseeability is evaluated from
consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing
else.”).
201. See Polzer v TRW, Inc., 682 N.Y.S.2d 194, 195 (App. Div. 1998); Huggins
v. Citibank, N.A., 585 S.E.2d 275, 277 (S.C. 2003).
202. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449, supra note 180.
203. Patrick v. Union State Bank, 681 So. 2d 1364, 1367 (Ala. 1996) (“The
cases applying the rule address the question whether a defendant owes a duty
to protect the plaintiff from violent physical criminal acts of a third person. In
fact, the rule has been stated as being that ‘one has no duty to protect another
from criminal attack by a third party.’”).
204. Id. at 1369.
205. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate
Cause, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1247, 1258 (2009) (“[A]lmost every jurisdiction
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the perspective of a reasonably prudent person in similar
circumstances. In the case of identity theft, it is practically
a foregone conclusion: with millions of new victims affected
each year,206 and increasingly-frequent breaches of personal
information,207 the risk of identity theft is nearly an
inevitable consequence of negligent credit practices.208
Nearly any person off the street knows the substantial
threat of identity theft, and thus a person whose business is
credit would have to have his proverbial head in the sand
not to be keenly aware of the looming risk of fraud.
Yet mere foreseeability does not give rise to a duty. 209
Duty, as a judicial policy decision, must take into account a
myriad of more subjective public policy considerations, such
as “the relationship of the parties, the nature of the
attendant risk, the opportunity and ability to exercise care,
and the public interest in the proposed solution.”210 Here the
relationship is that between a sophisticated defendant and
a practically helpless plaintiff: the former actively engaged
in the business of extending credit, and well aware of its
power and appeal to criminals, and the latter who—in most
cases—would have no reason to suspect that he is being
victimized and has few means to protect himself from it
even if he did. The opportunity to take steps to prevent the
harm is available only to the defendant, and indeed, he is
the last line of defense to this harm. The risk of fraud is
inherent in the business of credit, as it is one of essentially
selling money, and indeed one of the primary reasons
creditors run credit checks on its applicants is to screen out
those who have records of being dishonest or criminal. To
place the responsibility of verifying an applicant’s identity
on a creditor would not be an undue burden or too broad a
does treat foreseeability as a significant factor (and frequently the most
significant factor) in analyzing whether the duty element is met in a negligence
claim.”).
206. See Javelin Study, supra note 16.
207. Sprague & Ciocchetti, supra note 25, at 97-101.
208. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, CREDIT, ATM,
at 2-3.

AND

DEBIT CARDS, supra note 22,

209. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (N.Y. 2001)
(“Foreseeability, alone, does not define duty—it merely determines the scope of
the duty once it is determined to exist.”).
210. 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 79 (2012).
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liability to impose, but rather an intrinsically reasonable
one in considering the circumstances. Thus, judges should
and do recognize a duty of care.
b. Standard of Care, Legal Causation, and Damages.
Once the judicially-determined barrier of duty is
dismantled, the remainder of a negligence claim is easily
palatable. Breach, or standard of care, would rightly be a
jury question, and should take into account Learned Hand’s
principles, i.e., determining what relatively unburdensome
measures a creditor could take to prevent a very probable
harm.211 Certainly the Red Flags rules should also come into
play as an effective standard, 212 if not as a per se
presumption of negligence, at least as evidence that it would
not take any additional effort for creditors to undertake the
measures that they are already legally obligated to assume.
Of course, creditors could not, and should not, be liable for
every case of identity theft, but only those cases where the
creditors did not adhere to a minimum standard of
preventative measures. But therein lies the most important
reason why these claims need to be encouraged—to develop
this minimum standard for creditors to follow.
The remaining factors are relatively straightforward. A
creditor’s negligent issuance of a credit account would be a
very substantial factor in any consummated act of identity
theft and thus, its legal cause.213 Proximate cause, mainly
defined by foreseeability, is also straightforward, as the
type of harm suffered is exactly the type that one might
expect from such negligence.214 That harm, of course, takes
211. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)
(suggesting that negligence may be inferred when the burden of avoiding the
harm is less than the cost of the harm multiplied by its probability of
occurrence, and that the burden is not undertaken).
212. See Kevin D. Lyles, Red Flag Rules Require Companies to Take Identity
Theft Seriously, JONES DAY (Nov. 2008), http://www.jonesday.com/red-flag-rulesrequire-companies-to-take-identity-theft-seriously-11-12-2008/ (“In any event, it
is likely that, over time, the Red Flag Rules will become a de facto standard of
care applied to determine whether a company has negligently allowed a
customer’s identity to be stolen.”).
213. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965) (“The actor’s negligent
conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his conduct is a substantial
factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no rule of law relieving the
actor from liability because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted
in the harm.”).
214. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449, supra note 180.
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the form of the sometimes devastating damages discussed
in Part I.D of this Comment.
These non-duty issues are primarily questions of fact,
and therefore the average jury—who will be almost
statistically certain to have had some connection with
identity theft—would be deciding whether the credit
industry is doing enough to prevent fraud. The jury’s
answer is likely to change the way the credit industry
operates forever, providing, at long last, a line of defense
against identity theft.
CONCLUSION
Despite increased awareness, identity theft has
continued to thrive. Once victimized, an individual can
spend years trying to clear his or her name, meanwhile
suffering from the stigma of bad credit that may include
denial of services, loans, and employment, as well as
humiliation and even arrest. Victims are left with virtually
no means of obtaining remedy for these sometimes
substantial losses, even against those who are responsible
for the fraud’s occurrence. Likewise, while existing law
provides some measure of assistance to fraud victims
seeking to clean up their credit after the fact, it does little to
prevent future occurrences. Quite remarkably, creditgranting companies require very little proof of identity to
open new accounts. Even in the face of surging identity
theft rates, a social security number and most of a name are
often all that is required to obtain a credit card or turn on
utilities. Certainly this lackadaisical attitude toward
identity theft is partially responsible for identity theft’s
continued prominence. These inadequacies in prevention
and redress could be addressed by increasing the
accountability on credit-granting institutions. No major
legal overhaul is necessary to accomplish this; merely
allowing private enforcement of existing federal and
common law standards would suffice in promoting some
common-sense reforms. Nevertheless, until Congress and
the courts get serious about enforcing identity theft
prevention, the fight against identity theft will continue to
be a losing battle.

